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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OTAH 
ELIZABETH IRENE REISER, by 
and through her guardian, 
RICHARD E. REISER, and ELEANOR: 
RESIBR, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
RICHARD LOHNER and HOWARD 
FRANCIS, Medical Doctors, and 
PROVO OBSTETRICAL AND GYNE-
COLOGY CLINIC, INC., a Pro-
fessional corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 16,444 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is important to clarify several characterizations of 
fact recited in respondents' brief. 
Dr. Francis and Dr. Lohner both testified that the 
rotational system of seeing patients mandates that the 
"progress sheet" on each patient be properly filled out dis-
closing relevant information to the next doctor who might see 
the patient. The progress or cover sheet is a printed form 
supplied by a medical supply house (R.1231-32) which contains 
spaces for various notations to be made by the doctors during 
prenatal examinations. (R.1226). The form has a line stating 
"Rh negative" which Dr. Lehner circles when he has a patient 
who has that particular problem. (R.1231-32). It is undis-
puted that the fact that Mrs. Reiser was Rh negative was first 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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written on the chart by Dr. Lehner on June 24, 1971, Mrs. 
Reiser's thirty-eighth week of pregnancy. (R.1232). 
As compared with the whole series of titer tests run on 
Mrs. Reiser during her previous pregnancy, the highest of 
which was 1:4, (R. 1727, 1753), Dr. Lehner, because of the 
failure to note her Rh sensitivity earlier, ran only one 
titer test during her thirty~eighth week of pregnancy which 
was 1:128, approximately thirty times higher than the highest 
test result obtained in her previous pregnancy. Dr. Lohner 
testified that he had seen severe involvement of the baby 
with a titer test as low as 1:8 or 1:16 (R.1510) and according' 
had induced labor in the previous pregnancy when the titer 
reached 1:4. (R.1727,1753). Because Dr. Lehner did not 
perform a series of titer tests, he was unable to determine 
how fast the antibodies were building up. It was because of 
that failure that the amniocentesis was performed. 
The respondents do not take issue with the fact that 
Mrs. Reiser was not warned of all the possible adverse 
effects of the amniocentesis procedure (R. 1243, 1517-18), 
nor do respondents contend that there was any communication 
with Richard Reiser to inform him of the risks or to seek 
his assistance in persuading Mrs. Reiser to submit to induced 
labor. (R. 1244-45). 
Dr. Lehner testified that the only risks of the amnio-
centesis procedure that were explained to Mrs. Reiser were 
the-risks that the baby might be stuck with the needle a~ 
that the procedure might induce infection within the uterus. 
-2-
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(R. 1518). No explanation was made as to the risk of vaso-
vagal syndrome or supine hypotensive syndrome although such 
a risk was known to Dr. Lohner and the nurses. (R.1218-19, 
1222-1229). 
As Mrs. Reiser was being prepared for the amniocentesis, 
Dr. Lohner testified that he took the blood pressure and it 
was low (R.1251), but because of the unexpected occurrences, 
he did not record the blood pressure on the chart. (R.1522). 
Dr. Lohner testified that it was his practice to record the 
measurements as he was leaving the room and before seeing 
another patient,although his nurse, Mrs. Nielson, testified 
that she ordinarily records and documents the doctors' 
examination findings while with the patient. (R.1163-1167). 
Nurse Nielson had no recollection of the blood pressure of 
Mrs. Reiser being taken on June 26, 1971. (R. 1163). As 
pointed out at trial, Dr. Lohner stated in his deposition of 
August 3, 1974, that he left Mrs. Reiser's room after the 
amniocentesis to examine another patient in another examining 
room, yet still did not record a blood pressure for Mrs. 
Reiser. (R.1522). In any event, no blood pressure was 
recorded. 
Subsequent to the performance of the amniocentesis by 
Dr. Lohner, wherein Mrs. Reiser was on her back for a consider-
able period of time, she suffered a cardiac arrest. It is 
undisputed that the nurses did not start any resuscitative 
measures, instead, they left the room to look for smelling 
salts, which were never found. (R. 1178-1179). Mrs. Reiser 
-3-
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was cyanotic and was allowed by the nurses to remain in a 
supine position. Mrs. Nielson summoned Dr. Lohner who 
...., 
attempted to use, for the first time, an ambu bag. (R,13 531 . 
Dr. Lohner could not get a good seal around the mouth and 
accordingly discarded the apparatus which was capable of 
delivering significantly more oxygen to Mrs. Reiser than the 
use of mouth to mouth resucitation. (R.1317-18, 1535). 
Dr. Lehner performed both the mouth-to-mouth resuscit~ 
tion and the heart massage and did not seek the help of 
either of the two nurses. (R. 1535). As explained by Dr. 
Banner, the plaintiff's expert, the procedure used by Dr. 
Lohner aggravated the anoxia of the baby unnecessarily, 
since there were medically trained persons in the office. 
Dr. Banner and Dr. Roach testified that when two persons 
work together, one on mouth-to-mouth and one on cardiac 
massage, the amount of oxygen exchange is greatly increased. 
(R. 1316-17, 1405-1406). At no time did Dr. Lohner place a 
pillow or other device under Mrs. Reiser to transfer the 
weight of the baby off of the inferior vena cava, in order 
to provide increased circulation. 
The respondents make the statement that all of the 
experts in this case agree that never in medical history has 
the performance of an amniocentesis led to a cardiac arrest. 
But the respondents omit the important qualification that 
when an amniocentesis or surgical procedure is performed in 
late pregnancy, the patient is not laid supine on a hard 
table; instead, she is laid on the right side and cushions 
-4-
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are used lo support the back. An obvious explanation for 
the absence of a similar occurrence in medical literature is 
that Dr. Lohner, in contravention of: basic tenets of 
obstetrics, allowed the plaintiff to lay supine on a hard 
table for an extended period of time through the examination, 
amniocentesis and the resuscitation efforts. Hopefully, 
such errors in judgment and management are not common. 
Further, Dr. Roach explained that in a short period of 
years the Rh disease has been identified, therapeutic 
modalities developed to treat it, and finally, medical 
treatment discovered to prevent it. (R. 1369-80). Accordingly, 
the use of the amniocentesis procedure in a Rh disease case 
became antiquated in a short time. The chance that that 
development would be coupled, in medical literature, with 
supine hypotensive syndrome or vasovagal syndrome and then 
again with cardiac arrest and be recognized and reported as 
such are slim although each is separately known to arise in 
similar circumstances. (R. 1369-70). The respondents' state-
ment is analogous to researching a case where a man in a 
green shirt had a cardiac arrest while snow skiing. No one 
would doubt the authenticity or the possibility of their 
relation, but the chances of the report drawing all those 
factors out are slim. 
There is no dispute that all the doctors recognized 
hypotensive syndrome, vasovagal syndrome and the other 
factors in this case as known, significant obstetrical 
occurrences. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE 
THAT A TITER TEST WAS NOT TAKEN PRIOR TO JUNE 
24, 1971, AND THAT THE FIRST AMNIOCENTESIS 
WAS PERFORMED ON JUNE 26, 1971. 
a. Evidence can never be excluded merely because 
it is not the proximate cause of an injury. 
The respondents do not cite one case nor point to one 
rule of evidence that states that unless an act of the 
defendant is proven to the trial judge to be a proximate 
cause of an injury, evidence of that act may be excluded. 
The respondents do not take issue with the fact that the 
plaintiff's experts, if allowed to discuss the subject, 
would have testified to the causal connection between the 
failure to take a series of titers, the performance of a 
needless, ill-advised and dangerous amniocentesis at thirty-
eight weeks and the subsequent hypotensive syndrome and 
cardiac arrest. (R. 1077-1078). Further, Dr. Banner would 
have testified that, because of the low blood pressure 
evident on June 24th, the failure to monitor the vital sigM 
at the time of the performance of the amniocentesis on JuM 
26th, was a departure from medical standards and was 
causally connected to the result. Dr. Banner would also haft 
testified that the risk involved compared with the benefit 
to be derived from a single amniocentesis was so small that 
it was surely negligence to perform an amniocentesis under 
those circumstances. (R. 1078). 
-6-
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Once expert testimony is proffered on the subject, the 
question of proxiillate cause is a fact issue for the jury, 
which province the trial judge usurped by his ruling. 
Simply put, Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
as applied to this case, allows the exclusion of relevant 
evidence only if its admission creates substantial danger of 
undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading 
the jury. Federal cases interpreting Rule 403, which contains 
the same provisions of Rule 45, state that in deciding the 
question of admissibility, all doubt should be resolved in 
favor of admissibility (see, e.g., United States v. Alison, 
447F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1973)) and, if the evidence has probative 
value, it is ordinarily admissible regardless of an imagined 
reaction of the jury. Travis v. United States, 266 F.2d 
928, 939 (10th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds 364 U.S. 
631 (1961). The Court erred in adopting the test that 
evidence may be excluded if it is not proven to be the 
proximate cause of the injury and accordingly denied the 
plaintiff of the right to have the matter decided by the 
trier of fact. 
b. The defendants' own theory of the case 
established the causal connection between the faiiure to take 
the previous titers and the injury. 
While the defendants argued that the evidence of the 
failure to take previous titers was not a proximate cause, 
the defendants' experts made the causal connection. In 
explaining causation, the defendants' experts advanced the 
-7-
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theory that the cardiac arrest was the result of a vasovagal 
reflex. The testimony of the defendants and their experts 
is set out on pages 20-24 of the appellants' initial brief. 
The respondents totally misstate the evidence when they 
represent that "[I] t is admitted by plaintiffs that performing 
the amniocentesis procedure itself, i.e., insertion oft~ 
needles into the abdomen, had nothing to do with arrest." 
(Respondents' brief, p. 12). The whole thrust of the plain-
tiff's case is that the defendants' failure to take a series 
of titers during the course of Mrs. Reiser' s pregnancy was 
the reason Dr. Lohner performed the unnecessary and ill-
advised amniocentesis which is never performed in late 
pregnancy. The causal connection to that point is clear. 
The defendants' experts then testified that the actual 
performance of the amniocentesis caused the vasovagal syndrom 
which ended in a cardiac arrest. (R. 1810-11, 1292-93, 
1298-99, 1675-77). The defendants' experts testified that 
the vasovagal syndrome was well known to medical experts a~ 
that most physicians are very much aware of its occurrence. 
(R. 1822, 1810-11). Further, Dr. Sharp testified that 
patients have been known to go into cardiac arrest as a 
result of the syndrome. (R. 1810-11). 
Dr. Sharp then testified that a patient who had a blo~ 
pressure of ninety-two over forty-four (the blood pressure 
measured on Mrs. Reiser's prior visit) and was anxious and 
apprehensive (the symptoms observed by Dr. Lohner and the 
nurses) would be a fit candidate for the vasovagal syndrome. 
-8-
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(R. 1821-22). The causal connection between the mismanagement 
of the Rh condition, the needless amniocentesis and the 
cardiac arrest could not be clearer. 
Dr. Sharp also testified he ordinarily took a blood 
pressure before performing an amniocentesis, that blood 
pressure can change within a few minutes, and that quite 
often when a woman in late pregnancy lies down, her blood 
pressure drops. (R. 1827-28). The experts' testimony 
establishes the defendants' negligence in failing to take 
previous titers, failing to take a blood pressure, performing 
the amniocentesis and failing to recognize and avoid vasovagal 
syndrome which was caused by the amniocentesis process. 
The defendants' argument that the jury, in determining 
that there was no negligence in allowing Mrs. Reiser to stay 
on her back, removed a link from the chain of causation is 
totally specious. It was impossible for the jury to evaluate 
that precise point without the excluded evidence. The jury 
did not know that the plaintiff's and defendants' experts, 
if allowed to be questioned on the subject, would have 
testified that it was negligence not to perform a series of 
titers commencing during the early stages of pregnancy; that 
the results of one amniocentesis in late pregnancy is inadequate 
for any competent physician to reach a diagnostic conclusion 
concerning the involvement of the child; that they had never 
heard of an initial amniocentesis being performed at thirty-
eight weeks, and that under the circumstances of this case, 
the amniocentesis was a useless, dangerous procedure that, 
-9-
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according to Dr. Sharp, caused the cardiac arrest. (R. 
1070-74). The jury did not know that Dr. Banner and Dr. 
Roach would have testified that the failure to take a series 
of titers, to note her Rh problem initially, perform an 
amniocentesis in the earlier stages of pregnancy and otherwise 
manage the Rh pregnancy was a departure from acceptable 
medical standards and causally connected to the cardiac 
arrest. ( R. 1076-78). 
Finally, respondents indicate that Mrs. Reiser might 
have suffered the same result if she was undergoing a pro~r 
procedure such as a vaginal examination or induced labor. 
The critical difference is that in all such procedures, the 
doctors testified that the patient is turned slightly on ~r 
back and supported with cushions to avoid the problem crea~d 
by Dr. Lohner. 
c. The plaintiffs' theory of causation is suffi-
cient to prove proximate cause. 
Numerous state courts have adopted different requirements 
that a plaintiff has to meet in proving medical causation 
because medicine is not an exact science. The decision of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hamil v. -Bashline, 392 
A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978), is discussed on pages 24-26 of the 
appellant's brief. 
The United States Supreme Court dealt with the subject 
in Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107 
(1959). In that case, the Court eschewed the hackneyed 
dogma that medical opinions on the issue of causation which 
-10-
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included the defense-minded litany "reasonable medical 
certainty." In what remains today a leading opinion, the 
Court held that the jury was entitled to consider all possible 
medical conditions aggravating the plaintiff's worsening 
health, and wrote: 
The jury's power to draw the inference 
that the aggravation of petitioner's 
tubercular condition, evident so shortly 
after the accident, was in fact caused 
by the accident, was not impaired by the 
failure of any medical witness to testify 
that it was in fact the case. Neither can 
it be impaired by the lack of medical un-
animity as to the respective likelihood of 
the potential causes of the aggravation, 
or by the fact that other potential causes 
of the aggravation and were not conclusive-
ly negated by the proofs. The matter does 
not turn on the use of a particular form of 
words by the physicians in giving their 
testimony. The members of the jury, not 
the medical witnesses, were sworn to make 
a legal determination of the question of 
causation. They were entitled to take all 
of the circumstances, including the medical 
testimony, into consideration. 
Sentilles, supra, at 107 (1959). 
In commenting upon the trial Court's responsibility 
in these type of cases, the Court stated: 
Though this case involves a medical issue, 
it is no exception to the admonition that 
"it is not the function of the Court to 
search the record for conflicting circum-
stantial evidence in order to take the 
case away from the jury on the th~ory t~at 
the proof gives equal support to inconsis-
tent and uncertain inferences. The focal 
point of judicial review is the reasonable-
ness of the particular inference or con-
clusion drawn by the jury •••• the very 
essence of its [the jury's] function is to 
select from among conflicting inferences 
and conclusions that which it considers 
-11-
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most reasonable. . Courts are not free 
to re-weigh the evidence and set aside the 
jury verdict merely because the jury could 
have drawn different inferences or conclusions 
or because judges feel that other results 
are more reasonable. [Citing cases.] 
Sentilles, supra, at 110. 
As stated by the Court in Hamil v. Bashline, ~· the 
degree of medical certitude demanded of expert testimony on 
the issue of causation is lower where the alleged negligence 
is failure to render proper medical treatment. The Court 
drew a distinction between the two classes of tort cases: 
those in which the defendant's acts or omissions set in motion, 
a force which resulted in harm; and those, (as represented 
by the instant action), in which the defendant's acts or 
omissions breached a duty to protect against harm from 
another source. The Court stated that in the latter type 
of case, the "fact finder must consider not only what 
did occur but also what might have occurred. " had 
defendants performed the service properly. 
See also Kostamo v. Marquette Iron Company, 405 Mich. 
105, 132-133, 274 N.W. 2d 411, 423 (1970); Jeanes v. Milner, 
428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970). See also Green v. Lilewood, 
249 S.E. 2d 910 (S.C., 1978). 
It is submitted that the plaintiffs causually connected 
the failure to take prior titers and the performing of an 
amniocentesis at thirty-eight weeks with the cardiac arrest. 
Both the plaintiff's and defendants' expert would have 
established the causation. The elimination of such a critica
1 
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and substantial portion of the plaintiff's case is not 
supported by the rules of evidence nor the controlling law 
of medical causation. 
The respondent's claim that the injury to the plaintiffs 
was not reasonably "foreseeable" and thus the defendants' 
conduct could not be a "proximate cause" of the plaintiff's 
injury is misleading. (Respondents brief, pages 14-16). It 
is the respondents' contention that since a cardiac arrest 
had never, in medical history, resulted from an amniocentesis 
procedure, the defendant doctors should not be held to a 
duty to have forseen the potential risk. 
The test for proximate cause has been variously defined 
by several courts, but as a general rule the test is defined 
as follows: 
A proximate cause has been defined as an 
efficient cause and generally speaking, 
it has been said that a cause is proximate 
when it is not so remote in efficiency as 
to be dismissed from consideration by the 
court. The test applied to determine 
whether negligent conduct was the effi-
cient, or proximate, cause of an injury 
or loss suffered by the claimant is 
whether such conduct is a cause without 
which the injury would not have taken 
place, or is the efficient cause which set 
in motion the chain of circumstances leading 
up to the injury. In other words, a 
cause, to be efficient and proximate, 
need not be the sole cause of the injury; 
it is enough that it is a "proximate con-
curring cause." The fact that other 
causes concurred with the negligence of 
the defendant in producing an injury does 
not relieve him from liability unless it 
is shown that the other causes would have 
produced the injury independently of his 
negligence. The rule is that where an 
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efficient adequate cause for injuries has 
been found, it must be considered as the 
true cause, unless another, not incident 
to it, but independent of it, is shown to 
intervene. 
57 Am.Jur. 2d 401, Negligence §145. 
A vital inquiry in any case involving proximate cause 
is whether the negligent act set in motion a natural and 
unbroken chain of events that led directly and proximately 
to the injury. 
Normally a titer is performed on the first visit of an 
expectant Rh mother to the doctor's office (R. 268). Mrs. 
Reiser had been seen by Dr. Francis from her first visit 
until her visit on June 24, 1971. At that point, Dr. Franci 
was unavailable so Dr. Lehner visited with Mrs. Reiser. 
During that visit, he discovered that the mother was Rh 
sensitized and that no titer had been performed to that 
date. Dr. Lohner immediately ordered a titer which he 
subsequently discovered was extremely high. On June 26th, 
he called Mrs. Reiser into his office and convinced her that 
an immediate amniocentesis was necessary to determine the 
degree of involvement of the child. It was during the 
performance of the amniocentesis on June 26th that Mrs. 
Reiser had the cardiac arrest which resulted in the injury 
to the child. 
The respondents fail to realize that it was because of 
their prior failure to perform a titer and prior failure ~ 
perform an amniocentesis that Dr. Lohner panicked at the 
time of Mrs. Reiser's visit and ordered the immediate titer 
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and amniocentesis. Mrs. Reiser simply did not walk into Dr. 
Lohner's office and lay down upon the table in order to have 
an amniocentesis performed. She was there because the 
doctors had failed to make the proper test to diagnose the 
condition of the child prior to that date. As stated previously, 
the issue of causation could not be clearer. The defendants' 
own experts testified that the amniocentesis was the cause 
of the vasovagal syndrome which in turn caused the cardiac 
arrest. Further, it cannot be disputed, that Dr. Sharp 
and the other experts te,stified that the vasovagal syndrome 
and hypotensive syndrome was well known to physicians and 
that it had, in reported cases, led to a cardiac arrest. 
Several other courts have dealt with similar cases. In 
Landeros v. Flood, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 551 P.2d 389 (1976), a 
minor plaintiff brought a malpractice action against the 
doctor for failing to diagnose battered child syndrome and 
his failure to report the diagnosis of intentionally inflicted 
injuries to the proper authorities. The Supreme Court of 
California held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action 
in alleging that the doctor's omission in reporting the 
first incident of child abuse was the proximate cause of the 
subsequent injuries and that the intervening assaults by the 
mother and her common-law husband were not superseding 
causes of the injuries since the behavior was forseeable by 
the doctor. In so ruling, the Court stated as follows: 
The second principal question in this case 
is proximate cause. Under the allegations 
of the comolaint it is evident that the 
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continued beating inflicted on plaintiff 
by her mother and R0yes after she was 
released from the San Jose Hospital and 
returned to their custody constituted an 
"intervening act" that was the immediate 
cause in fact of the injuries for which she 
seeks to recover. (Rest. 2d Torts, §441). 
It is well settled in this state, however, 
that an intervening act does not amount to 
a "superseding cause" relieving a negligent 
defendant of liability (Id., §440), if it 
was reasonably forseeable: "[A)n actor 
may be liable if his negligence is the 
substantial factor in causing an injury, 
and he is not relieved from liability because 
of the intervening act of a third person 
if such act was reasonably forseeable at 
the time of his negligent conduct. [Citing 
cases]. Moreover, under §449 of the Rest. 
2d of Torts forseeability may arise 
directly from the risk created by the 
original act of negligence: "If the 
likelihood that a third person may act in 
an particular manner is the hazard or one 
of the hazards which makes the actor 
negligent, such an act whether innocent, 
negligent, intentionally tortious, or 
criminal does not prevent the actor from 
being liable for the harm caused thereby. 
[citing cases]. 
As we recently observed with respect to 
a determination of duty, however, "for-
seeability is a question of fact for the 
jury." [citing cases] • The same rule 
applies where the issue is whether the 
intervening act of a third person was 
forseeable and therefore did not consti-
tute a superseding cause: In such 
circumstances "the forseeability of the 
risk generally frames a question for the 
trier of fact." [citing cases]. 
In Sanderson v. Moline, 7 Wash. App. 439, 499 P.2d 1281, 
(1972), a malpractice action against a dentist based upon 
alleged negligence diagnosis, care, and treatment which 
allowed the plaintiff's dental condition to deteriorate W 
an advanced stage of periodontal disease, the Court ruled 
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that it was error for the trial court to remove from the 
jury's consideration the evidence of the dentist's failure 
to properly monitor the progressive deterioration of the 
condition of plaintiff's teeth. The Court stated: 
We agree with plaintiff's objection to 
the trial court's removal from jury 
consideration of evidence of defendant's 
failure to chart home care instructions 
in the progressive deterioration of the 
plaintiff's condition. Although the 
Court's reason for the removal related 
to the question of proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's condition, which in isolation 
was arguably correct, the ruling disre-
garded the fact that the testimony could 
be significant in the jury's consideration 
of the defendant's negligence in the care, 
diagnosis and treatment of the plaintiff's 
disease. 
In Purcell v. Zindelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 
(1972), the Court sustained a denial of the motion in limine 
by the defendant doctor to preclude the admissibility of 
evidence of filing prior malpractice suits against the 
surgeon. The Court ruled that the records were admissible 
since they tended to show the doctor's inability to properly 
treat the illness and his misconception of proper surgical 
treatment. 
More recently, in the case of Gildiner v. Thomas 
Jefferson University Hospital, 451 F.Supp. 692 (E.D. Penn. 
1978), the Court was faced with the problem of whether the 
plaintiff parents had stated a cause of action for the 
negligence of a physician in performing an amniocentesis to 
determine whether an infant would be born with Tay-Sachs 
disease: 
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The defendants further argue that the 
alleged negligence of the defendants, that 
of not properly administering or inter-
preting the amniocentesis, was not the 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damages. 
The defendants argue that the damage 
sustained by the plaintiff were caused 
by the affliction of Andrew Lane Gildiner 
with Tay-Sachs disease in that the defen-
dants did not cause Andrew Lane Gildiner 
to become afflicted with the disease •.• 
Applying Pennsylvania law, we decline 
to follow Gleitman v. Cosgrove in similar 
cases. We hold that the relevant causal 
relationship is that between the defen-
dants' negligence in performing or inter-
preting the amniocentesis and the subse-
quent birth of Andrew Lane Gildiner. The 
complaint states a sufficient causal rela-
tionship between the alleged negligence of 
the defendants and the failure of Mark and 
Linda Gildiner to obtain an abortion to 
defeat a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings based upon a lack of proximate cause. 
Even apart from the proximate cause of injury, the 
failure of the doctors to take previous titers and amnio-
centesis was admissible as part of the medical record. It 
is axiomatic that all medical records in a medical malpractice 
action should be admitted since they "constitute a substantial 
portion of the information available" to the doctor upon 
which the doctor "partially bases his operative decisions 
and thus are material and relevant." Sandoval v. Daniels, 
532 P.2d 759 (Colo. 1975). 
The plaintiffs will not attempt to restate the testimony 
that the defendant doctors and the experts called to testify 
in this case all recognized hypertensive syndrome, vasovagal 
syndrome and the accompanying risk of cardiac arrest and 
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anoxia to be significant, known obstetrical occurrences. 
The vice of the respondents' statement and allowed argument 
to the jury to the effect that "never in medical history has 
a cardiac arrest follov1ed from an amniocentesis," is twofold. 
First, the plaintiffs were precluded at trial from introducing 
evidence to show that amniocentesis are never performed in 
the late stages of pregnancy, and accordingly, no significant 
portion of the population has ever been subjected to the 
treatment imposed by these defendants and thus there is no 
recorded history. Secondly, the statement totally misconstrues 
and misstates the circumstances relating to the procedure. 
In all of the medical literature, and from the testimony 
of every expert at trial, there has never been a case where 
an amniocentesis was initially performed at thirty-eight 
weeks to determine the effect of Rh negative antigens in 
the child's blood. In fact, the graph perfected by Dr. A. 
W. Liley and used by Dr. Lehner in this case, does not 
extend beyond thirty-seven weeks. Since Dr. Lehner, performed 
this first initial amniocentesis at thirty-eight and half 
weeks, he had to tape additional paper on the edge to plot 
his results because of the physical limitations of the 
graph. (R. 288). The overwhelming body of medical litera-
ture on the subject is all in the agreement that the defen-
dants' use of the titers and amniocentesis was contrary to 
accepted medical procedure. (R. 288-290). 
Even Dr. Stenchever, the defendants' expert, in his 
published ;rticles adopting procedures contrary to those used 
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by the defendants. Of all the amniocentesis performed by 
Dr. Stenchever for study of the Rh factor, there were never 
less than two amniocentesis performed and none after thirty-
six weeks. (R. 290). The plaintiff was prevented from cross-
examining Dr. Stenchever in this regard. 
Aside from the extremely unusual use of the amniocentesis 
in the late stages of pregnancy, it is important to under-
stand that the amniocentesis process, as related to Rh 
involvement diagnosis, was very short lived and affected a 
minimal number of women. The process was not in general 
clinical use until approximately 1965. (R. 291, 1369-80). 
In 1968, the antedate Rhogam was clinically available, which 
is the process by which an Rh sensitized mother may, by 
innoculation, be immunized from further Rh negative contam-
ination, consequently, only mothers who were Rh sensitized 
prior to 1968 are proper candidates for an amniocentesis 
procedure to determine Rh involvement of the fetus. (R. 
291, 1369-80). 
For the defendants to contend that there is no statis-
tical record of cardiac seizure following an amniocentesis 
has no significance. Persons such as Mrs. Reiser fit within 
a small category because Rh negative sensitization affects 
only a limited number of people. Second, those few persons 
sensitized were not always given an amniocentesis as 
illustrated by Mrs. Reiser's fourth and fifth pregnancies. 
Third, none of those tested were tested in the thirty-
· tics 
eighth week (advanced pregnancy). Fourth, medical statis 
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are not required to be kept or assembled. 
It is established that supine hypotensive syndrome is 
so commonly known that there is no record of a competent 
physician allowing, let alone requiring, his patient to lie 
flat on her back, on a hard table, for more than five minutes 
when in her thirty-eighth week of pregnancy. Finally, 
statistical evidence as related to cardiac seizure under 
circumstances such as presented in this case is not recorded 
under the title "amniocentesis," but is noted under other 
topics. There is a plethora of authorities for cardiac 
seizure following and during anesthetic procedures with 
accompanying supine hypotensive syndrome. Simply put, when 
respondents say that there is no history of cardiac seizure 
from an amniocentesis at thirty-eight weeks, they might also 
say that there is no history of an amniocentesis ever being 
performed for Rh negative sensitation for the first time at 
thirty-eight weeks. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING A SPECIAL 
VERDICT TO THE JORY AND THE VERDICT 
FORM DID NOT ADEQUATELY ALLOW THE JURY 
TO CONSIDER PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF THE 
CASE. 
In their original brief, the appellants set out the 
evidence supporting the issues of negligence that should 
have been submitted to the jury. In that brief, the appellants 
list nine questions, many with subparts, that the plaintiffs 
had a right to submit to the jury. (Appellants brief, pages 
30-36). The respondents make essentially two responses. 
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First, it is their contention that the two negligence 
questions submitted by the court to the jury properly 
present all of the issues to the jury. The respondents do 
not claim that the appellants did not have the right to 
present the various issues to the jury, but only that tho~ 
issues were encompassed into the two negligence questions 
submitted to the jury or were waived. 
It seems incredible that the respondents would have 
this Court believe that the question "Was defendant, Richa~ 
Lohner, negligent in allowing Mrs. Reiser to lie on her back 
for an excessive period of time?", was to be interpreted by 
the jury as including, 1) were the nurses negligent in 
failing to timely recognize Mrs. Reiser's symptoms;2) were 
the nurses negligent in failing to take timely steps to 
relieve the symptoms; 3) were the nurses negligent in 
failing to seek the assistance of the doctor rather than 
tamper with a developing emergency; 4) did Mrs. Reiser 
suffer from a vasovagal syndrome as suggested by Dr. Sharp 
and Dr. Lobner and if so, was it negligence not to antici-
pate such an occurrence and be prepared with counter measures; 
and 5) did Mrs. Reiser suffer from a hypotensive syndrome 
and if so, was it negligence not to anticipate such an 
occurrence, to lay the patient on her side and be prepared 
with counter measures? 
Further, the respondents would have this Court believe 
that the question "Was the defendant, Richard Lobner, negligen: 
in the acts and efforts utilized or not utilized to resuscitat: 
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Mrs. Reiser during the time she was unconscious?", encompassed 
the issues: 1) were the defendants negligent in failing to 
have adequate and operative resuscitative equipment on the 
premises such as drugs, oxygen, inhalers, and intubation 
equipment; 2) were the defendants negligent in not main-
taining a ready emergency or crash guard--fully equipped 
with drugs, oxygen, etc.; 3) were the defendants negligent 
in failing to train and prepare the nursing staff in emergency 
resuscitation measures; and 4) was Dr. Lohner negligent in 
failing to utilize the assistance of nurses in the rescue 
measures taken when the proof indicated that two or more 
persons can provide significantly more resuscitation than 
one man attempting chest pressure and mouth-to-mouth resusci-
tation at the same time? 
There can be no question that the issues of whether or 
not Dr. Lohner was negligent in allowing Mrs. Reiser to 
reject induction under the circumstances of the case and 
whether the defendants were negligent in failing to initially 
and periodically consult with Dr. Reiser to discuss the 
nature of the problem and their urgent concern, were clearly 
issues not encompassed, in any degree, within the interroga-
tories submitted to the jury. Further the issues of informed 
consent and the issues relating to the excluded evidence 
were also not given to the jury in any fashion. 
The only other response made by the defendants is that 
the plaintiffs waived the right to present those issues to 
the jury. such an argument totally misconstrues the under-
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standing of court and counsel. Counsel indicated to the 
court, that because of the granting of the motion in limine, 
excluding significant portions of the plaintiffs case, the 
issues which could be submitted to the jury were greatly 
restricted. At no time did counsel make any waiver of the 
right to submit all the issues to the jury and any argument 
to the contrary is a gross misconstruction of the record. 
(R. 1865, 1087-1090). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE TO 
THE JURY THE ISSUE OF INFORMED CONSENT. 
The appellants will rely on their initial brief to 
support their contention except to comment that Mrs. Reiser 
surely should have been advised that 1) an amniocentesis is 
never performed at thirty-eight weeks and, 2) the risks of 
hypertensive syndrome and vasovagal syndrome. 
POIN'f IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS 
FIRST AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION. 
a. The plaintiffs should have been granted a 
trial on the applicability of the statute of limitations. 
In its initial brief, plaintiffs cited U.C.A. 78-12-47 
for the proposition that applicable Utah law grants either 
party to a medical malpractice action the right to a trial 
on the issue of the statute of limitations. Defendants have 
countered by saying that the statute is permissive in 
nature, and not mandatory. Although it is possible that a 
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literal interpretation of the statute might yield such a 
conclusion, several factors militate against it. 
If, as defendant seems to claim, application of the 
statute of limitations is primarily a question of law to be 
decided by the court, then the statute has virtually no 
effect and is surplusage to the Code. Such is not the case. 
It is obvious that the legislature recognized the difficult 
factual problems involved in applying the statute of limitations 
to medical malpractice actions, and therefore carved out a 
special exception. It is true that the specific language of 
the statute is that the issue "may" rather than "must" be 
tried separately, but it is obvious from the mere existence 
and general tenor of the statute, that the legislature 
recognized the importance and difficulty of the statute 
limitations in malpractice actions, and sought to preclude 
a mechanical application thereof by a court acting without 
a jury. 
Furthermore, 78-12-47 is a reinforcement of the Utah 
Supreme Court's stand on the nature of summary judgment. 
First, upon motion for summary judgment, the trial court is 
required to consider all relevant facts and their reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the party against 
whom the motion is made. The Utah Supreme Court noted in 
Controlled Receivables Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah2d 420, 413 
P.2d 807 (1966) as follows: 
-25-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A motion for summary judgment is a harsh 
measure, and for this reason plaintiff's con-
tentions must be considered in a light most to 
his advantage and all doubts resolved in favor 
of permitting him to go to trial; and only if 
when the whole matter is so viewed, he could, 
nevertheless, establish no right to recovery, 
should the motion be granted. 
Second, if the facts and their reasonable inferences when 
viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party are 
in dispute, summary judgment is simply improper. In 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975) the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
It is nottbe purpose of the summary judgment 
procedure to judge the credibility of the aver-
ments of the parties or witnesses or the weight 
of the evidence. Neither is it to deny parties 
the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues 
of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate the time, 
trouble and expense of trial when upon any view 
taken of the facts as asserted by the party 
ruled against, he would not be entitled to pre-
vail. 
Plaintiffs, in connection with their Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 790-791) 
submitted affidavits containing facts that substantially 
controverted those submitted by defendants. Those facts put 
the statute of limitations in dispute as a material iss~ of 
fact. The lower court apparently ignored the fact that a 
genuine dispute existed and granted defendants' motion. 
Such action was clearly error, violating the spirit of 
U.C.A. 78-12-47, and the letter of Rule 56(c) URCP (summary 
judgment). 
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b. The lower court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' 
cause of action for Emotional Distress to the Parents. 
Defendant has cited a variety of cases for the proposi-
tion that no cause of action arises for negligently inflicted 
emotional distress. Counsel for plaintiff would reiterate 
the position taken in his initial brief, i.e., that the Utah 
cases denying recovery for emotional distress are inapplicable, 
that justice requires that relief be afforded, ~nd that this 
Court should recognize such a cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the court erred in granting the defen-
dants' Motion in Limine, and, consequently, the court erred 
in failing to properly treat the issue of informed consent 
and in failing to submit a proper verdict to the jury. In 
addition, the court erred in granting the defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Mrs. Reiser's cause of action for 
her own personal injuries, and on the parents cause of 
action for emotional distress. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of November, 1980. 
L 
~"'°~ HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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